THE ERA OF THE WILAYAS

 Before his departure from Al-Andalus, Musa undertook a number of administrative measures to insure adherence to the policies he had laid down for the newly conquered territory. Most important of such measures was the appointment of his son 'Abdul-'Aziz as Wali (governor) with Seville as the capital.

 'Abdul-'Aziz certainly did not fail his father.  For soon after his father's convoy disappeared beyond the horizon together with thousands of prisoners and loads of booty collected from palaces and churches, ëAbdul-íAziz launched a campaign against the areas hitherto not touched by either his father or Tariq.

From Seville, the capital, 'Abdul-'Aziz headed west, toward Portugal, starting with Evora then Santarem and Coimbra, all of which were captured with relative ease.  From there he turned north-east and captured Astorga in the vicinity of Leon where Tariq had reached before being recalled with Musa to Damascus. Having subdued the area, he turned south-east toward Malaga which, it is said, was handed over to him by the Jewish community after overthrowing the ruler of that important port city.  From Malaga ''Abdul-'Aziz marched northward along the coast and swept all the coastal positions as he headed toward Tarragona, the last strong-hold captured by his father before his departure.  From there he turned north-west through Huesca to Pamplona.

 Almost three years had passed  since the Arabs set foot on  the Iberian soil, during which time their grip had become firmly tight over most of the country, with the exception of a few enclaves in the extreme north.

 The fact that the Arabs were not really interested in settling in the remote areas of the north did not mean that they had neglected them completely, for in every place they captured they had established an appropriate garrison.  But in view of the limited number of troops they had at their disposal, only small garrisons could be afforded those remote areas.  It was never determined,  however whether any of the Arab rulers had ever seriously considered the idea of establishing settlements there.
 
 

 One of the most important of those successive events was the fall of the sword of the caliphate over the  head of 'Abdul-'Aziz in 716, less than one year after taking office as the first 'wali' (governor) of the Muslim state of Al-Andalus, marking the first among a long chain of political assassinations  during the Arab rule in Al-Andalus. One of the reasons given by some historians for this particular assassination was the fact that the caliphate was becoming rather concerned about the growing popularity of the wali, the son of the much admired commander who had conquered the new territory.  Other historians claim that the caliphate became suspicious of the sincerity of the wali who, they thought, was becoming heavily influenced by the enemy following his marriage to the widow of king Rodrigo.  However the most likely reason was that the new khalifain Damascus, who had caused the disappearance of Musa, the father, thought it more prudent to get rid of the son as well.

But the most serious weakness of the Arab socio-political structure in what they named Al-Andalus was the absence of a stategy to amalgamate the various elements  pouring into the new territory from north Africa and other Arab provinces in the east into a single homogenious Andalusian society.  For by the nature of things, tribal groups tended to congregate in separate settlements, carrying with them their tribal allegiances and differences, which very often were utilised by governors as a polerising instrument in their struggle for power.  But although a few  rulers had in fact made some effort towards implementing certain amalgamation policies, such efforts had always stumbled on the rocks of deep-rooted tribalism and individualism inherent in the character of both the Arab and Berber settlers.

Another possible factor which perhaps had an inhibiting effect on real social amalgamation was the fact that the vanguards of Arab settlers had probably imagined that the conquest of Al-Andalus was no more than a further step in the long chain of Arab conquests which had brought them from the Arabian Peninsula to the Iberian Peninsula, a mere transitory stay pending a decision to proceed with their long march.

Furthermore, the succession of walis during this period caused successive fluctuation in the allegiance of this province between Qairawan, the capital of the north African province and Damascus, the capital of the caliphate, reflecting the instability of the Umayyad rule in Damascus and the gradual loosening of their grip over the remote provinces.

Another factor which contributed toward the fragmentation of society was the absence of the concept of state-hood and national identity.  Hence the only link which held together the various social factions of which the Andalusian congregation, not to say society, was formed, was the tribal link;  and tribal differences were by no means confined to the Andalusian settlers, for in Damascus as well, tribal affiliations  were the most important criteria on which the selection of the ruler or wali of the new territory was based, and therefore, the socio-political orientations and attitudes of the various tribal factions there were largely affected by the tribal affiliations of successive rulers.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Al-Andalus witnessed twenty two walis during the era of the walis which lasted forty two years, the term of office of seven of whom not lasting more than six months and that of five, less than a year.

The era of the walis was not, however, as bleak as this might suggest.  The 'jihad',  against the enemy, continued as long as the walis maintained their mandate long enough for them to be able to organise campaigns against the enemy strongholds, or at least neutralise their fellow Arabs who were always ready to jump on their thrones.

The Arab army even crossed the Pyrenees on more than one occasion under the leadership of many an Arab wali, and made deep penetrations into Gaul (France) and carried out numerous punitive and mopping up operations in various parts of the Iberian Peninsula.
 
 

Seven walis came and disappeared after ëAnbasa, all within seven years.  Even Al-Ghafiqi, the most experienced, most enlightened and most courageous of all the walis did not last long.  He too fell in combat against the armies of Charles Martelle in 732 near Poitiers (France), during  the biggest and most ambitious campaign ever undertaken by the Arabs beyond the Pyrenees.

This disastrous battle which witnessed the fall of al-Ghafiqi and the defeat of the Arab army marked a turning point in the history of Europe, as the resistance of Gaul began taking the shape of a European military alliance with the crucifix as it's emblem.  Not only did the victory of these allied forces virtually make it impossible for any further attempt by the Arabs to establish a foothold of any strategic importance north of the Pyrenees, but also encouraged them to even  entertain the idea of conquering the northern extremities of the Arab state of Al-Andalus and form an alliance with the Iberian resistance forces with view of an eventual re-conquest of the whole peninsula.
 

This defeat, and the successive defeat of Uqba ibn al-Hajjaj near Septamenie (France) almost broke the back of the Arabs and pushed them to the brim of disaster.  But the precarious situation in which the Arabs of Al-Andalus found themselves in was not only due to their defeat in the battles that took place beyong the Pyrenese .  For in addition to the perilous mess Qairawan was in, owing to the erosion of it's strength following those defeats, the very structure of the Umayyad caliphate in Damascus was collapsing; and in the absence of a powerful fist capable of upholding the authority of government, internal strife in Al-Andalus took a dangerous turn, as the conflict now was not restricted to tribalism, as between the major tribes Qais and Yemen, but also to the geographical origin of those tribes as to whether they were Syrian or Hijazi, or whether they were early settlers or  new comers.  But the most serious development was perhaps the racial friction between the Arabs and the Berbers.

In fact, the Arab-Berber feuds had already surfaced as far back as the early stages of the conquest, when the Berbers, who were the vanguards of the Muslim thrust into the new territory, felt outraged at the disappearance of their leader Tariq ibn Ziyad into complete oblivion in Damascus. Not only that, but the Berbers felt that the only reward they had  had for their valour, courage and sacrifices were shrouds for the thousands who fell in battle and some barren land to dig a livelihood from. The Arabs, on the other hand, enjoyed the highest positions in the administrative hierarchy and were given rich land which provided them with the necessary means for a much superior standard of living.

Whether the grievances of the Berbers were well-founded or not, the fact remains that the treatment of the Berbers by the Arabs, during the stages that followed led, undoubtedly, to the kindling of the fires of successive revolts throughout the life of the Arab state of Al-Andalus which, to say the least, had posed a very serious threat to the very existence of the Arabs both in north Africa and in Al-Andalus, caused them  enormous problems and cost them thousands upon thousands of lives.

The stage was thus set for the big upheaval.  All it needed was the spark which was finally kindled by the very wali of north Africa in Qairawan, a fanatic Qaisi who was intent upon the suppression of all those who were outside the circle of his tribe. The worse affected were however, the Berbers.  The Berbers had little to lose.  They were the under-dogs.  They took to arms in 734, and the fire of revolt spread rapidly beyond control and was soon to reach the Andalusian province across the straits.

The Berbers of Al-Andalus did not need much convincing into joining forces with their kinsmen across the straits.  Like their north African brothers, the Berbers of Al-Andalus had been subjected  to pressures, for some time, by certain Khawarij and Abadi  shiite groups which had penetrated into North Africa and began spreading the shiite theology, and sowing the seeds of revolt against the Sunni Umayyads, while capitalising on the ill feelings of the Berbers towards their Arab lords.

For obvious reasons, this Berber upheaval was hailed by the Christian resistance groups in the north of the peninsula. An alliance was soon struck between those groups and the revolting Berbers, and soon their allied forces launched a three-pronged campaign against the major strategic Arab strong-holds, Toledo, Cordoba and Algeciras.

On the north African front, the Arabs suffered one defeat after another, notwithstanding the enormous forces despatched by the caliphate in Damascus numbering, according to some sources, some thirty thousand strong. For although the Syrian force was hand picked and included well trained and experienced fighters, the leadership, which was shared with officers from the north African contingent, was void of homogeneity,  which was reflected also in the lower ranks of the rescue force.  Here again the Arabs had failed, even in those dangerous circumstances, to forget their tribal jealousies and  differences, or at least freeze them until such time when the swords threatening their very existence were finally broken.

Of all the blows suffered by the Arabs during the succession of battles fought against the Berbers, the most crippling was the one dealt to them at the battle of Al-Ashraf (the nobles) which cost the Arabs some of their most important commanders and nobles as well as an uncountable number of fighters.  With this defeat, the Arabs lost control of Al-Maghrib (North Africa) with the exception of one enclave which stubbornly resisted the Berber attacks, and which was destined to play a crucial role in the future of Al-Andalus, as it did before, on the eve of the Arab conquest of the Iberian Peninsula. This enclave was Ceuta.

In the meanwhile, the Berber forces in Al-Andalus  and their Christian allies were tightening their grip over the most important Arab positions including Cordoba, the capital.  The Arabs of Al-Andalus were in no better position than their brethren in Al-Maghrib during the Berber tidal swell.  If anything, they were in a much worse situation having fallen prey to their most fierce tribal feuds while the swords of their enemies, the Berbers and their allies were actively harvesting their heads and capturing their positions.

The situation became increasingly crucial as the Berber troops advanced closer towards the capital Cordoba.  What made the situation seem even more desperate was the fact that the Arabs in Al-Andalus were only a minority compared to the large Berber majority.

Overwhelmed by desperation, the wali of Al-Andalus, 'Abdul-Malik ibn Qatan, suddenly remembered the Syrian contingent besieged by the Berbers in Ceuta , on the opposite side of the straits from where the ships of Tariq had once sailed.  It was only then that the wali had remembered the calls of distress that came from the commander of that besieged contingent pleading for help or permission to cross with his starving troops to Al-Andalus.  It was only then that those distress calls came alive to the wali's mind. Those cries did not move him then. For those besieged were not from his own tribe.

But now the situation is different.  He is in danger, real danger.  He is threatened.  His very existence is at risk.  He had to seek help.  And across the straits were seven thousand desperate soldiers, hungry and in distress.  Permission to cross the straits to Al-Andalus was thus granted. There was one condition though. Once the rebellion was quelled, the Syrian troops were to leave the Peninsula.  Balj ibn Bishr, the commander of the besieged Syrian contingent had no choice. He accepted.

The wali, however, was not the trusting type.  Upon arrival of the Syrian troops in 742, he took a number of officers hostage in order to insure the departure of the Syrian troops as soon as their mission was accomplished.  That done, Balj lead his troops to Algeciras in order to cut off supply lines from the Berbers of Al-Maghrib to their fellow Berbers across the straits. From there, the troops headed towards Cordoba and were soon able to break off the siege laid by the Berbers and their allies and march towards Toledo.  There again, the siege was broken and with the collapse of those three fronts the revolt of the Berbers of Al-Andalus was finally foiled in the year 742.

The day of  reckoning with the visiting troops came soon after the dust of battle had  settled down.  Balj, the commander was asked to honour the conditions of the agreement.  But where could they go.  Any attempt to return to north Africa would have led to their destruction by the Berbers who were still in control there.

Then the inevitable happened.  The Syrians who had saved the wilaya from falling into the hands of the Berbers and their Christian allies were in no mood to leave the Peninsula.  When their desire to stay was denied by the wali, they decided to take what they really deserved, need be, by force.  They marched to the capital, Cordoba, captured the palace, arrested the wali and proclaimed Balj, their commander as governor.  The reaction of the followers of the deposed wali was swift, and old foes united.  The early settlers, baladiyyunand the Berbers as well as all factions opposed to the Syrians, Shamiyyununited under the same banner and soon came to grips with the Syrians.

The confrontation was sparked off when one of the hostages held by the old wali was beaten to death.  When this became known in Cordoba, the reaction was immediate and fierce.  The deposed eighty year old wali was the first to fall under the swords of the angry Syrian soldiers, and blood flowed from the necks of the combating brothers, leaving the main battlefield to the mercy of the real enemy, the Christians in the north, who grasped the opportunity which presented itself by the self destructive attitude of the invaders, and began re-organising themselves in the upper reaches of the northern areas, while the flames of civil war were fiercely spreading throughout Al-Andalus. The very pillars of the young Muslim state began rocking under the feet of warring brothers.

With this threat from the north looming in the horizon, a handful of wise men went from Al-Andalus to Qairawan soon after the Berber rebellion was quelled in 742 by another army from Damascus, and pleaded to the wali to use his good offices in putting an end to that dangerous and unacceptable situation.  Following the intervention of the wali, the caliphate in Damascus appointed a new governor for Al-Andalus by the name of  Abul-Khattar al-Kalbi in 743.  The new governor, who was accepted readily by all the warring factions, wasted no time in enforcing a new policy based on "rapprochement" and equitable sharing of power.  Among the first applications of the policy of the new wali was the dissolution of physical concentrations of the various factions of the population and the expulsion of agitators and instigators from the country.

This wise policy was, however, short-lived.  For when the feuds between the new comers and the original settlers subsided, inter tribal feuds soon erupted again, and the one that set a-glow the embers again was the very one who was appointed by the caliphate to put an end, once and for all, to every trace of tribal  conflict.

It all happened when a Yemeni, a friend of the wali was killed by a Qaisi.  This was enough to strip that distinguished, well balanced, fair minded and peace loving man of all these qualities, and bring him back to his deeply entrenched tribal nature.  He was now a Yemeni before being a wali, and his duty towards his tribe came before his duty towards his public post and before that of his nation at large.  Priorities in tribal life are not questionable.

Again  those feuds began simmering when his bias against the Qaisis became only too obvious, and those feuds surfaced up one day when the wali favoured a Yemeni in a dispute with a Qaisi, and the Qaisis stood up against what they considered an obvious bias against their tribe.  In an effort to ease the tension and possibly avert the verdict, a Qaisi leader by the name of As-Sumail, tried to intervene with the wali.  He was not only refused audience, but was also insulted.  This was enough justification for the Qaisis to rebel in support of one of their leaders, and consequently bring down the wali and appoint a Qaisi in his place.

As-Sumail, who was insulted and whose insult sparked off the upheaval, was not interested in the post of wali.  He placed someone else in the post in 747, a Qaisi by the name of Yusuf al-Fihri. This done, As-Sumail returned to his castle in Zaragoza, in the north, from where he manipulated the puppet wali in Cordoba and thus became the un-crowned king of Al-Andalus.

The tug-of-war continued between the Qaisis who, under the new wali and his benefactor, were trying to consolidate their position as rulers of the land, and the Yemenis who claimed they were the rightful and legitimate rulers, and thus were trying relentlessly to regain power.  Throughout this process, new bonds were sealed and old formulas dissolved, new battles were fought and old conspiracies unveiled, but all in all, the pattern hardly changed.  In reality nothing changed from  the early days of the first wali to those of the last one... conspiracies, disunity and blood shed; and the underlying reason was in essence one: tribalism.

On 7 July 750, the Umayyads in Damascus were over-thrown by the Abbasids, and their sun sank in the east, only to rise in the west.